Institutio Oratoria

Conjectural [*]( For this technical term = cases turning on questions of fact, see III. vi. 30 sqq. ) cases, on the other hand—that is to say questions of fact—require a statement, which will more often deal with the circumstances from which a knowledge of the point at issue may be derived than with the actual point which is under trial. When the accuser states these circumstances in such a manner as to throw suspicion on the case for the defence, and the accused has consequently to dispel that suspicion, the facts must be presented to the judge in quite a different light by the latter.

But, it may be urged, some arguments are strong when put forward in bulk, but far less effective when employed separately. My answer is that this remark does not affect the question whether we ought to make a statement of fact, but concerns the question how it should be made. For what is there to prevent us from amassing and producing a number of arguments in the statement, if that is likely to help our cause? Or from subdividing our statement of facts and appending the proofs to their respective sections and so passing on to what remains to be said?

Neither do I agree with those who assert that the order of our statement of facts should always follow the actual order of events, but have a preference for adopting the order which I consider most suitable. For this purpose we can employ a variety of figures. Sometimes, when we bring up a point in a place better suited to our purpose, we may pretend that it had escaped our notice;

For there is no single law or fixed rule governing the method of defence. We must consider what is most advantageous in the circumstances and nature of the case, and treat the wound as its nature dictates, dressing at once or, if the dressing can be delayed, applying a temporary bandage.

Again I do not regard it as a crime to repeat a statement of a fact more than once, as Cicero does in the pro Cluentio. It is not merely permissible, but sometimes necessary, as in trials for extortion and all complicated cases; and only a lunatic will allow a superstitious observance of rules to lead him counter to the interests of his case.