Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

In the second case Caesar would doubtless never deliberate on the question at all, but for the perturbation shown by his soldiers; but there is still room for enquiry whether quite apart from this occurrence it

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would be wise to penetrate into Germany. But it must be remembered that we shall always speak first on that subject which is capable of discussion quite apart from the consequences.

Some have held that the three main considerations in an advisory speech are honour, expediency and necessity. I can find no place for the last. For however great the violence which may threaten us, it may be necessary for us to suffer something, but we are not compelled to do anything; whereas the subject of deliberation is primarily whether we shall do anything.

Or if by necessity they mean that into which we are driven by fear of worse things, the question will be one of expediency. For example, if a garrison is besieged by overwhelmingly superior forces and, owing to the failure of food and water supplies, discusses surrender to the enemy, and it is urged that it is a matter of necessity, the words

otherwise we shall perish

must needs be added: consequently there is no necessity arising out of the circumstances themselves, for death is a possible alternative. And as a matter of fact the Saguntines [*]( In 218 B. C., when besieged by Hannibal. See Livy, xxi. 14. ) did not surrender, nor did those who were surrounded on the raft from Opitergium. [*]( C. Antonius was blockaded in an island off the Dalmatian coast which he held for Caesar 49 B. C. Reinforcements on rafts were sent to his rescue. Most were captured; but in one case, of a raft carrying 1,000 men from Opitergium in Venetia, surrender was scorned and the men slew each other rather than yield. See Lucan, iv. 462; Florus, ii. 33. )

It follows that in such cases also the question will be either one of expediency alone or of a choice between expediency and honour.

But,

it will be urged,

if a man would beget children, he is under the necessity of taking a wife.

Certainly. But he who wishes to become a father must needs be quite clear that he must take a wife.

It appears to me, therefore, that where necessity exists, there is no room for deliberation, any more than where it is clear that a thing is

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not feasible. For deliberation is always concerned with questions where some doubt exists. Those therefore are wiser who make the third consideration for deliberative oratory to be τὸ δυνατόν or

possibility

as we translate it; the translation may seem clumsy, but it is the only word available.

That all these considerations need not necessarily obtrude themselves in every case is too obvious to need explanation. Most writers, however, say that there are more than three. But the further considerations which they would add are really but species of the three general considerations just mentioned. For right, justice, piety, equity and mercy (for thus they translate τὸ ἥμερον ), with any other virtues that anyone may be pleased to add, all come under the heading of that which is honourable.

On the other hand, if the question be whether a thing is easy, great, pleasant or free from danger, it comes under questions of expediency. Such topics arise from some contradiction; for example a thing is expedient, but difficult, or trivial, or unpleasant, or dangerous.