Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

the conjectural, definitive, qualitative, quantitative and relative. Theodorus, also, as I have said, [*](§ 36.) adopts the same number of general heads, whether a thing is, what it is, of what kind it is, how great it is, and to what it refers. The last he considers to be chiefly concerned with comparison, since better and worse, greater and less

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are meaningless terms unless referred to some standard.

But questions of relation, as I have already pointed out, enter also into translative questions, that is, questions of competence, since in cases such as

Has this man a right to bring an action?
or
Is it fitting that he should do such and such a thing, or against this man, or at this time, or in this manner?
For all these questions must be referred to a certain standard.

Others hold that there are six bases: conjecture or γένεσις, quality, particularity or ἰδιότης by which word they mean definition, quantity or ἀξία, comparison and competence, for which a new term has been found in μετάστασις I call it new when applied to a basis, for Hermagoras employs it to describe a species of juridical question.

Others think there are seven, while refusing to recognise competence, quantity or comparison, in place of which they substitute four legal bases, [*](See § 46.) completing the seven by the addition of those three which they call rational. [*](Conjectural, definitive, qualitative.)

Others again make eight by the addition of competence to the above-mentioned seven. Some on the other hand have introduced a fresh method of division, reserving the name of bases for the rational, and giving the name of questions to the legal, as I mentioned above, [*](§ 46.) since in the former the problem is concerned with facts, in the latter with the letter of the law. Some on the contrary reverse this nomenclature calling the legal questions bases and the rational grounds questions.

But others have thought that there are only three rational bases, covered by the questions whether a thing is, what it is, and of what kind it is? Hermagoras is alone in thinking that there are four, namely conjecture, particularity, competence, and quality: to the latter he

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appends the phrase κατὰ συμβεβηκός
according to its accidents,
illustrating his meaning by putting a case where it is enquired whether a man happen to be good or bad. He then subdivides quality into four species: first that which is concerned with things to he sought or avoided, which belongs to deliberative oratory:

secondly those concerned with persons, by which he indicates panegyric: thirdly the practical or pragmatic, which is concerned with things in general without reference to persons, and may be illustrated by questions such as whether he is free who is claimed as a slave and waiting the trial of his case, [*](assertio = a trial in which the question of a person's liberty is involved. When waiting trial, this person is described as in assertiolle. ) whether riches beget insolence, and whether a thing is just or good; lastly there is the juridical species, under which practically the same questions arise, but in relation to certain definite persons, as for instance when it is asked whether that particular man has done well or ill.

I am aware that another explanation is given by Cicero in the first book of his Rhetorica [*](de Inv. i. xi. 14. ) of the species known as practical, where he says that it is

the department under which we consider what is right according to civil usage and equity: this department is regarded by us as the special sphere of the lawyer.