Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Then comes time in another sense, called καιρός by the Greeks, by which they refer to a period of time, such as summer or winter;

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under this heading come problems such as that about the man who held high revel in a time of pestilence. [*](There is no other reference to this theme.) Action or πρᾶξις, to which they refer questions as to whether an act was committed wittingly or unwittingly, by accident or under compulsion and the like. Number, which falls under the category of quantity, under which come questions such as whether the state owes Thrasybulus thirty talents for ridding it of the same number of tyrants.

Cause, under which heading come a large number of disputes, whenever a fact is not denied, but the defence pleads that the act was just and reasonable. τρόπος or manner, which is involved when a thing is said to have been done in one way when it might have been done in another: under this category come cases of such as that of the adulterer who is scourged with thongs or starved to death. [*]( An adulterer caught flagrante delicto might be killed by the husband or beaten. But to starve him to death in cold blood would be illegal. ) Opportunity for action, the meaning of which is too obvious to need explanation or illustration: the Greeks however call it ἔργων ἀφορμαί

These authorities like Aristotle hold that no question can arise which does not come under one of these heads. Some subtract two of them, namely number and opportunity, and substitute for what I have called action, things, or in Greek πράγματα. I have thought it sufficient to notice these doctrines, for fear someone might complain of their omission. Still I do not consider that bases are sufficiently determined by these categories, nor that the latter cover every possible kind of topic, as will be clear to any that read carefully what I have to say on both points. For there will be found to be many topics that are not covered by these categories.

I find it stated in many authors that some rhetoricians only recognise one kind of basis, the con-

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jectural. But they have not mentioned who these rhetoricians are nor have I been able to discover. They are however stated to have taken this view on the ground that all our knowledge is a matter of inference from indications. On this line of reasoning they might regard all bases as qualitative, because we inquire into the nature of the subject in every case. But the adoption of either view leads to inextricable confusion.

Nor does it matter whether one recognises only one kind of basis or none at all, if all causes are of the same nature. Coniectura is derived from conicere

to throw together,

because it implies the concentration of the reason on the truth. For this reason interpreters of dreams and all other phenomena are called coniectores

conjecturers.

But the conjectural basis has received more names than one, as will appear in the sequel.

Some have recognised only two bases. Archedemus [*](Fr. 11, Arnim.) for instance admits only the conjectural and definitive and refuses to admit the qualitative, since he held that questions of quality take the form of

What is unfair? what is unjust? what is disobedience?

which he terms questions about identity and difference. [*](i.e. the question may be stated Does it conform to our conception of injustice or is it something different? Questions of quality are regarded as questions of definition. )

A different view was held by those who likewise only admitted two bases, but made them the negative and juridical. The negative basis is identical with that which we call the conjectural, to which some give the name of negative absolutely, others only in part, these latter holding that conjecture is employed by the accuser, denial only by the accused.