Ab urbe condita

Titus Livius (Livy)

Livy. History of Rome, Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.

object may have been to discharge a vow to some deity. But if we are to trust the authority of Fabius, he did this to prevent the Dictator from reaping the fruits of his glory, or carrying the

spoils in his triumph and afterwards placing his name upon them.[*](The name of the victorious general was generally inscribed on such spoils of the enemy as were offered to a deity, generally either Romulus or Jupiter, and hung up in his temple. We have an instance of an inscription on the spoils in Vol. I. p. 244.) The fact also of his sending the despatches announcing his victory to the senate and not to the Dictator would seem to show that he was by no means anxious to allow him any share in the credit of it. At all events the Dictator took it in that night, and whilst everybody else was jubilant at the victory which

had been won, he wore an expression of gloom and wrath. He abruptly dismissed the senate and hurried from the Senate-house, repeatedly exclaiming that the authority and dignity of the Dictator would be as completely overthrown by the Master of the Horse as the Samnite legions had been if this contempt of his orders were to remain unpunished. In this angry and

menacing mood, he started with all possible speed for the camp. He was unable, however, to reach it before news arrived of his approach, for messengers had started from

the City in advance of him, bringing word that the Dictator was coming bent on vengeance, and almost every other word he uttered was in praise of T Manlius.[*](Papirius was evidently hoping to take T. Manlius for his model and re-enact the scene described in chap. vii.)

Fabius immediately summoned his troops to assembly, and appealed to them to show the same courage with which they had defended the republic from a brave and determined foe in protecting from the unrestrained ferocity of the Dictator the man under whose auspices and generalship they had been victorious.

He was coming, maddened by jealousy, exasperated at another man's merits and good fortune, furious because the republic had triumphed in his absence. If it were in his power to change the fortune of the day, he would rather that victory rested with the Samnites than with the Romans.

He kept talking about the contempt of orders as though the reason why he forbade all fighting were not precisely the same as that which makes him vexed now that we have fought.

Then, prompted by jealousy, he wanted to suppress the merits of others and deprive of their arms men who were most eager to use them, so as to prevent their being employed in his absence; now he is exasperated and furious because the soldiers were not crippled or defenceless though L. Papirius was not with them, and because Q. Fabius considered himself Master of the Horse and not the lacquey of the Dictator.

What would he have done if, as often happens amid the chances of war, the battle had gone against us, seeing that now, after the enemy has been thoroughly defeated and a victory won for the republic which even under his unrivalled generalship could not have been more complete, he is actually menacing the Master of the Horse with punishment! He would, were it in his power, treat all with equal severity, not only the Master of Horse but the military tribunes, the centurions, the men of the rank and file.

Jealousy, like lightning, strikes the summits, and because he cannot reach all he has selected one man as his victim whom he regards as the chief conspirator —your general.