Ab urbe condita

Titus Livius (Livy)

Livy. History of Rome, Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.

The[*](Battle near Tifernum.) consuls were busy with their arrangements for the campaign, deciding which of them should deal with the Etruscans, and which with the Samnites, what troops they would each require, which field of

operations each was best fitted for, when envoys arrived from Sutrium, Nepete, and Falerii bringing definite information that the local assemblies of Etruria were being convened to decide upon a peace policy.

On the strength of this information the whole weight of war was turned against the Samnites. In order to facilitate the transport of supplies, and also to make the enemy more uncertain as to the line of the Roman advance, Fabius led his legions by way of Sora, while Decius proceeded through the Sidicine district.

When they had crossed the frontiers of Samnium they marched on a widely extended front, laying the country waste as they went on.

They threw out their scouting parties still more widely, and so did not fail to discover the enemy near Tifernum.

They had concealed themselves in a secluded valley, prepared to attack the Romans, should they enter the valley, from the rising ground on each side. Fabius removed the baggage into a safe place and left a small guard over it.

He then informed his men that a battle was impending, and massing them into a solid square came up to the above-mentioned hiding-place of the enemy.

The Samnites, finding all chance of a surprise hopeless, since matters would have to be decided by an action in the open, thought it better to meet their foes in a pitched battle. Accordingly they came down to the lower ground, and placed themselves in the hands of Fortune with more of courage than of hope.

But whether it was that they had got together the whole strength out of every community in Samnium, or that their courage was stimulated by the thought that their very existence as a nation depended upon this battle, they certainly did succeed in creating a good deal of alarm in the Roman ranks, even though they were fighting in a fair field.

When Fabius saw that the enemy were holding their ground in every part of the field, he rode up to the first line with his son, Maximus, and Marcus Valerius, both

military tribunes, and ordered them to go to the cavalry and tell them that if they remembered any single occasion on which the republic had been aided by the efforts of the

cavalry, they should that day strive their utmost to sustain the reputation of that invincible arm of the State, for the enemy were standing immovable against the infantry and all their hopes rested on the cavalry.

He made a personal appeal to each of them, showering commendations upon them and holding out the prospect of great rewards.

Since, however, the cavalry charge might fail in its object, and attacking in force prove useless, he thought he ought to adopt a stratagem. Scipio, one of his staff, received instructions to draw off the hastati of the first legion and, attracting as little observation as possible, take them to the nearest hills.