Bellum Iugurthinum

Sallust

Sallust. Sallust, Florus, and Velleius Paterculus. Watson, J. S. (John Selby), translator. London: Harper and Brothers, 1899.

The Romans, on a sudden, observed a vast cloud of dust, which, as the ground, thickly covered with brushes, obstructed their view, they at first supposed to be only sand raised by the wind; but at length, when they saw that it continued uniform, and approached nearer and nearer as the line advanced, they understood the real cause of it, and, hastily seizing their arms, drew up, as their commander directed, before the camp. When the enemy came up, both sides rushed to the encounter with loud shouts. But the Numidians maintained the contest only as long as they trusted for support to their elephants; for, when they saw the animals entangled in the boughs of the trees, and dispersed or surrounded by the enemy, they betook themselves to flight, and most of them, having thrown away their arms, escaped, by favor of the hill, or of the night, which was now coming on, without injury. Of the elephants, four were taken, and the rest, to the number of forty, were killed.

The Romans, though fatigued and exhausted[*](LIII. Fatigued and exhausted] Fessi lassique. I am once more obliged to desert Cortius, who reads lœtique. The sense, as Kritzius and Dietsch observe, shows that lœti can not be the reading, for there must evidently be a complete antithesis between the two parts of the sentence; an antithesis which would be destroyed by the introduction of lœti. Gerlach, though he retains lœti in his text, condemns it in his notes.) with their march, the construction of their camp, and the engagement, yet, as Metellus was longer in coming than they expected, advanced to meet him in regular and steady order. The subtlety of the Numidians, indeed, allowed them neither rest nor relaxation. But as the two parties drew together, in the obscurity of the night, each occasioned, by a noise like that of enemies approaching, alarm and trepidation in the other; and, had not parties of horse, sent forward from both sides, ascertained the truth, a fatal disaster was on the point of happening from the mistake. However, in place of fear, joy quickly succeeded; the soldiers met with mutual congratulations, relating their adventures, or listening to those of others, and each extolling his own achievements to the skies. For thus it is with human affairs; in success, even cowards may boast; while defeat lowers the character even of heroes.

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Metellus remained four days in the same camp. He carefully provided for the recovery of the wounded, rewarded, in military fashion, such as had distinguished themselves in the engagements, and praised and thanked them all in a public address; exhorting them to maintain equal resolution in their future labors, which would be less arduous, as they had fought sufficiently for victory, and would now have to contend only for spoil. In the mean time he dispatched deserters, and other eligible persons, to ascertain where Jugurtha was, or what he was doing; whether he had but few followers, or a large army; and how he conducted himself under his defeat. The prince, he found, had retreated to places full of wood, well defended by nature, and was there collecting an army, which would be more numerous indeed than the former, but inactive and inefficient, as being composed of men better acquainted with husbandry and cattle than with war. This had happened from the circumstance, that, in case of flight, none of the Numidian troops, except the royal cavalry, follow their king; the rest disperse, wherever inclination leads them; nor is this thought any disgrace to them as soldiers, such being the custom of the people.

Metellus, therefore, seeing that Jugurtha's spirit was still unsubdued; that a war was being renewed, which could only be conducted[*](LIV. Which could only be conducted, etc.] Quod, nisi ex illius lubidine, geri non posset. Cortius omits the non before posset, but almost every other editor, except Allen, has retained it, from a conviction of necessity.) according to the prince's pleasure; and that he was struggling with the enemy on unequal terms, as the Numidians suffered a defeat with less loss than his own men gained a victory, he resolved to manage the contest, not by pitched battles or regular warfare, but in another method. He accordingly marched into the richest parts of Numidia, captured and burned many fortresses and towns, which were insufficiently or wholly undefended, put the youth to the sword, and gave up every thing else as plunder to his soldiers. From the terror caused by these proceedings, many persons were given up as hostages to the Romans; corn, and other necessaries, were supplied in abundance; and garrisons were admitted wherever Metellus thought fit.

These measures alarmed Jugurtha much more than the loss of the late battle; for he, whose whole security lay in flight, was compelled to pursue; and he who could not defend his own

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part of the kingdom, was obliged to make war in that which was occupied by others. Under these circumstances, however,[*](Under these circumstances, however] Ex copiâ tamen. With copiâ we must understand consiliorum or rerum, as at the end of c. 39. All the manuscripts, except two, have inopiâ, which editors have justly rejected as inconsistent with the sense.) he adopted what seemed the most eligible plan. He ordered the main body of his army to continue stationary; while he himself, with a select troop of cavalry, went in pursuit of Metellus, and coming upon him unperceived, by means of night marches and by-roads, he fell upon such of the Roman as were straggling about, of whom the greater number, being unarmed, were slain, and several others made prisoners; not one of them, indeed, escaped unharmed; and the Numidians, before assistance could arrive from the camp, fled, as they had been ordered, to the nearest hills.