(Hadr. 16)
--which gave occasion to a work which was undoubtedly written at a much later time, title
It is probable that he was still a slave (Arrian, Dissert. 1.9, 29)
when C. Musonius Rufus gained him for the philosophy of the Porch, of which he remained a
faithful follower throughout life. In what manner he conceived and taught it, we see with
satisfactory completeness from the notes which we owe to his faithful pupil, Arrian; although
of Arrian's eight books of commentaries four are lost, with the exception of a few
fragments.
Epictetus himself did not leave anything written behind him, and the short manual or
collection of the most essential doctrines of Epictetus, was compiled from his discourses by
Arrian. (Simplic. in Enchirid.
Prooem.)
The The manual (
We may apply to Epictetus himself what he says of his Stoic master, viz. that he spoke so
impressively, and so plainly described the wickedness of the individual, that every one felt
struck. as though he himself had been spoken to personally. (Dissert.
3.23, 29, comp. 100.15, 1.9.) Being deeply impressed with his vocation as a teacher, he aimed
in his discourses at nothing else but winning the minds of his hearers to that which was
good, and no one was able to resist the impression which they produced. (Arrian, Ep. ad L. Gell. i. p. 4.) Far from any contempt of knowledge, he knows how
to value the theory of forming conclusions and the like. (Dissert. 1.7,
1, &c., comp. 1.8, 1, &c.. 1.17, 2.23, 25.) He only desired that logical exercises,
the study of books and of eloquence, should not lead persons away from that of which they
were merely the means, and that they should not minister to pride, haughtiness, and avarice.
(1.8. 6, &c., 29. 55, 2.4. 11, 9. 17, 16. 34, 17. 34, 21. 20, 3.2. 23, 17. 28, 24. 78.)
He never devotes any time to disquisitions which do not, either directly or indirectly,
contribute towards awakening, animating, and purifying man's moral conduct. (1.17. 15, 29.
58, 2.19. 10; comp. 4.8. 24, 6. 24.)
The true Cynic--and he is the same as the Stoic, the philosopher,--is in the opinion of
Epictetus a messenger of Zeus, sent to men to deliver them from their erroneous notions about
good and evil, and about happiness and unhappiness (3.22. 23), and to lead them back into
themselves. (ib. 39.) For this purpose he requires natural gracefulness
and acuteness of intellect (ib. 90), for his words are to produce a
lively impression.
The beginning of philosophy, according to him, is the perception of one's own weakness and
of one's inability to do that which is needful. (2.11. 1; comp. 3.23. 34, 2.17. 1.) Along
with this perception we become aware of the contest which is going on among men, and we grow
anxious to ascertain the cause of it, and consequently to discover a standard by which we may
give our decision (2.11. 13, &c.): to meditate upon this and to dwell upon it, is called
philosophizing. (ib. 24; comp. 3.10. 6.) The things which are to be
measured are conceptions, which form the material; the work which is to be constructed out of
them, is their just and natural application, and a control over them. (3.22. 20, 23. 42.)
This just choice of conceptions and our consent to or decision in their favour (
That which is in accordance with reason coincides with that which is in accordance with nature and pleasing to God. (1.12. 9, 26. 2, 3.20. 13, 2.10. 4, 1.12. 8.) Our resemblance to God (1.12. 27), or our relationship to the Deity (1.9. 1, 11), and the coincidence of our own will with the will of God (2.17. 22, comp. 19. 26, 3.24. 95, 4.1, 89. 103, 4. 39), consist in our acting in accordance with reason and in freedom. Through reason our souls are as closely connected and mixed up with the Deity, as though they were parts of him (1.14. 6, 2.8. 11, 13, 17. 33); for mind, knowledge, and reason, constitute the essence of God, and are identical with the essence of good. (2.8. 1, &c.) Let us therefore invoke God's assistance in our strife after the good (2.18. 29, comp. 1.6. 21), let us emulate him (2.14. 13), let us purify that which is our guide within us (3.22. 19), and let us be pure with the pure within us, and with the Deity! (2.18. 19.)
The prophet within us, who announces to us the nature of good and evil (2.7. 2), is the
daemon, the divine part of every one, his never-resting and incorruptible guardian. (1.14.
12.) He manifests himself in our opinions, which have something common with one another and
are agreeing with one another (1.22. 1 ); for they are the things which are self-evident, and
which we feel obliged to carry into action, though we may combat them. (2.20. 1.) That which
is good we must recognize as such a thing: wherever it appears, it draws us towards itself,
and it is impossible to reject the conception of good. (3.3. 4, comp. 1.4. 1.) The opinions
just described are the helps which nature has given to every one for discovering that which
is true. (4.1.. 51.) Wherever they are not recognized, as is the case with the followers of
the New Academy, our mind and modesty become petrified. (1.5. 3.) To investigate this
criticism of what is in accordance with nature, and to master it in its application to
individual things, is the object of all our scientific endeavors (1.11. 15), and ths mastery
is obtained only by the cultivation of our mind and by education. (
Epictetus is well aware, that man, as such, is a member of the great cosmic community of
gods and men, and also that he is a member of the communities of state and family, and that
he stands to them in the same relation as a limb to the whole organic body, and that
therefore he can attain his full development only with them. (2.5. 26, 10. 3, &c., 2. 19,
13.) He recognizes the necessity of love and confidence (2.22. 4, 1), and he demands of the
Cynic, that is, the true philosopher, to renounce marriage and family life, only that he may
devote himself with all his powers to the service of the deity, and to
the duties of an unlimited philanthropy. (3.22. 67. &c.) It is true that with Epictetus,
too, the place of a political system and a considerable portion of ethics, are supplied by
the ideal of a philosopher,--but how could a living consciousness of the nature of a state
have been formed in his time and in his circumstances? In his endeavours to establish in
himself and others a moral standard, unaffected by the corruptions of his age, he does not
perceive its close and necessary connexion with the active and unchecked scientific and
artistic efforts. But he acknowledges their moral importance more than his predecessors, and
he is impressed with the conviction, that the individual must live for the whole, although he
is not able to determine the how in a manner productive of great
results. Above all things, however, he gave up the proud self-sufficieney which the Stoic
philosopher was expected to shew in his relation to the vicissitudes of the world and of man.
The maxim suffer and, abstain (from evil) (Fragm.
179; comp. Dissert. 4.8. 25;
Chr. Crelius, De
Epicteti Dissertat. Lipsiae, 1711-16; comp. Brucker in Temp. Helvet. 3.2. p. 260.