On the other hand, the dispute may turn on a passage of the law which is clear in one sense and doubtful in another. The son of a harlot shall not address the people. A woman who had a son became a prostitute. The youth is forbidden to address the people. Here there is no doubt about the son of one who was a prostitute before his birth, but it is doubtful whether the law applies to the case of one born before his mother became a prostitute.

Another question which is not infrequently raised is as to the interpretation of the law forbidding an action to be brought twice on the same dispute, the problem being whether the word twice refers to the prosecutor or the prosecution. Such are the points arising out of the obscurity of the law. A second form of question turns on some passage where the meaning is clear. Those who have given exclusive attention to this class of question call it the basis concerned with the obvious expression of the law and its intention. In such circumstances one party will rest their case on the letter, the other on the intention of the law.

There are three different methods in which we may combat the letter. The first comes into play where it is clear that it is impossible always to observe the letter of the law. Children shall support their parents under penalty of imprisonment. It is clear, in the first place, that this cannot apply to an infant. At this point we shall turn to other possible exceptions and distinguish as follows. Does this apply to everyone who refuses to support his parent? Has this particular individual incurred the penalty by this particular act?

The second arises in scholastic themes where no argument can be drawn from the particular law, but the question is concerned solely with the subject of the dispute. A foreigner who goes up on to the wall shall be liable to capital punishment. The enemy had scaled the wall and were driven back by a foreigner. His punishment is demanded.

In this case we shall not have two separate questions, namely, whether every foreigner who goes up on the wall is liable to the penalty, and whether this particular foreigner is liable, since no more forcible argument can be brought against the application of the letter of the law than the fact in dispute, but the only question to be raised will be whether a foreigner may not go on to the wall even for the purpose of saving the city. Therefore we shall rest our case on equity and the intention of the law. It is, however, sometimes possible to draw examples from other laws to show that we cannot always stand by the letter, as Cicero did in his defence of Caecina.

The third method becomes operative when we find something in the actual words of the law which enables us to prove that the intention of the legislator was different. The following theme will provide an example. Anyone who is caught at night with steel in his hands shall be thrown into prison. A man is found wearing a steel ring, and is imprisoned by the magistrate. In this case the use of the word caught is sufficient proof that the word steel was only intended by the law in the sense of a weapon of offence.

But just as the advocate who rests his case on the intention of the law must wherever possible impugn the letter of the law, so he who defends the letter of the law must also seek to gain support from the intention. Again, in cases concerned with wills it sometimes happens that the intention of the testator is clear, though it has not been expressed in writing: an example of this occurs in the trial of Curius, which gave rise to the well-known argument between Lucius Crassus and Scaevola.

A second heir had been appointed in the event of a posthumous son dying while a minor. No posthumous son was born. The next of kin claimed the property. Who could doubt that the intention of the testator was that the same man should inherit in the event of the son not being born who would have inherited in the event of his death? But he had not written this in his will.

Again, the opposite case, that is to say, when what is written is obviously contrary to tile intention of the writer, occurred quite recently. A man who had made a bequest of 5000 sesterces, on altering his will erased the word sesterces and inserted pounds of silver. About 384 sesterces go to the pound of silver. But it was clear that he had meant not 5000 but 5 pounds of silver, because the weight of silver mentioned in the bequest was unparalleled and incredible.

The same basis includes such general questions as to whether we should stand by the letter or the intention of the document, and what was the purpose of the writer, while for the treatment of such questions we must have recourse to quality or conjecture, with which I think I have dealt in sufficient detail.