<GetPassage xmlns:tei="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns="http://chs.harvard.edu/xmlns/cts">
            <request>
                <requestName>GetPassage</requestName>
                <requestUrn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2:5.9.1-5.9.16</requestUrn>
            </request>
            <reply>
                <urn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2:5.9.1-5.9.16</urn>
                <passage>
                    <TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div n="urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2" type="translation" xml:lang="eng"><div n="5" type="textpart" subtype="book"><div n="9" type="textpart" subtype="chapter"><div n="1" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Every artificial proof consists either of indications, arguments or
                            examples. I am well aware that many consider indications to form part of
                            the arguments. My reasons for distinguishing them are twofold. In the
                            first place indications as a rule come under the head of inartificial
                            proofs: for a bloodstained garment, a shriek, a dark blotch and the like
                            are all evidence analogous to documentary or oral evidence and rumours;
                            they are not discovered by the orator, but are given him with the case
                            itself. </p></div><div n="2" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> My second reason was that indications, if indubitable, are not
                            arguments, since they leave no room for question, while arguments are
                            only possible in controversial matters. If on the other hand they are
                            doubtful, they are not arguments, but require arguments to support them.
                        </p></div><div n="3" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> The two first species into which artificial proofs <pb n="v4-6 p.197"/>
                            may be divided are, as I have already said, those which involve a
                            conclusion and those which do not. The former are those which cannot be
                            otherwise and are called <foreign xml:lang="grc">τεκμήρια,</foreign> by
                            the Greeks, because they are indications from which there is no getting
                            away. These however seem to me scarcely to come under the rules of art.
                            For where an indication is irrefutable, there can be no dispute as to
                            facts. </p></div><div n="4" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> This happens whenever there can be no doubt that something is being or
                            has been done, or when it is impossible for it to be or have been done.
                            In such cases there can be no dispute as to the fact. This kind of proof
                            may be considered in connexion with past, present or future time. </p></div><div n="5" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> For example, a woman who is delivered of a child must have had
                            intercourse with a man, and the reference is to the past. When there is
                            a high wind at sea, there must be waves, and the reference is to the
                            present. When a man has received a wound in the heart, he is bound to
                            die, and the reference is to the future. Nor again can there be a
                            harvest where no seed has been sown, nor can a man be at Rome when he is
                            at Athens, nor have been wounded by a sword when he has no scar. Some
                            have the same force when reversed: </p></div><div n="6" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> a man who breathes is alive, and a man who is alive breathes. Some again
                            cannot be reversed: because he who walks moves it does not follow that
                            he who moves walks. </p></div><div n="7" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> So too a woman, who has not been delivered of a child, may have had
                            intercourse with a man, there may be waves without a high wind, and a
                            man may die without having received a wound in the heart. Similarly seed
                            may be sown without a harvest resulting, a man, who was never at Athens,
                            may <pb n="v4-6 p.199"/> never have been at Rome, and a man who has a
                            scar may not have received a sword-wound. </p></div><div n="8" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> There are other indications or <foreign xml:lang="grc">εἰκότα,</foreign>
                            that is probabilities, as the Greeks call them, which do not involve a
                            necessary conclusion. These may not be sufficient in themselves to
                            remove doubt, but may yet be of the greatest value when taken in
                            conjunction with other indications. </p></div><div n="9" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> The Latin equivalent of the Greek <foreign xml:lang="grc">σημεῖον</foreign> is <hi rend="italic">signum,</hi> a sign, though
                            some have called it <hi rend="italic">indicium,</hi> an indication, or
                                <hi rend="italic">vestigium,</hi> a trace. Such signs or indications
                            enable us to infer that something else has happened; blood for instance
                            may lead us to infer that a murder has taken place. But bloodstains on a
                            garment may be the result of the slaying of a victim at a sacrifice or
                            of bleeding at the nose. Everyone who has a bloodstain on his clothes is
                            not necessarily a murderer. </p></div><div n="10" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> But although such an indication may not amount to proof in itself, yet
                            it may be produced as evidence in conjunction with other indications,
                            such for instance as the fact that the man with the bloodstain was the
                            enemy of the murdered man, had threatened him previously or was in the
                            same place with him. Add the indication in question to these, and what
                            was previously only a suspicion may become a certainty. </p></div><div n="11" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> On the other hand there are indications which may be made to serve
                            either party, such as livid spots, swellings which may be regarded as
                            symptoms either of poisoning or of bad health, or a wound in the breast
                            which may be treated as a proof of murder or of suicide. The force of
                            such indications depends on the amount of extraneous support which they
                            receive. </p></div><div n="12" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Hermagoras would include among such indications as do not involve a
                            necessary conclusion, an <pb n="v4-6 p.201"/> argument such as the
                            following, <quote> Atalanta cannot be a virgin, as she has been roaming
                                the woods in the company of young men. </quote> If we accept this
                            view, I fear that we shall come to treat all inferences from a fact as
                            indications. None the less such arguments are in practice treated
                            exactly as if they were indications. </p></div><div n="13" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Nor do the Areopagites, when they condemned a boy for plucking out the
                            eyes of quails, seem to have had anything else in their mind than the
                            consideration that such conduct was an indication of a perverted
                            character which might prove hurtful to many, if he had been allowed to
                            grow up. So, too, the popularity of Spurius Maelius and Marcus Manlius
                            was regarded as an indication that they were aiming at supreme power.
                        </p></div><div n="14" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> However, I fear that this line of reasoning will carry us too far. For
                            if it is an indication of adultery that a woman bathes with men, the
                            fact that she revels with young men or even an intimate friendship will
                            also be indications of the same offence. Again depilation, a voluptuous
                            gait, or womanish attire may be regarded as indications of effeminacy
                            and unmanliness by anyone who thinks that such symptoms are the result
                            of an immoral character, just as blood is the result of a wound: for
                            anything, that springs from the matter under investigation and comes to
                            our notice, may properly be called an indication. </p></div><div n="15" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Similarly it is also usual to give the names of signs to frequently
                            observed phenomena, such as prognostics of the weather which we may
                            illustrate by the Vergilian <quote rend="blockquote"><cit><quote><l part="N">For wind turns Phoebe's face to ruddy
                                            gold</l></quote><bibl default="false">Verg. G. i. 431.</bibl></cit></quote> and <quote rend="blockquote"><cit><quote><l part="F">The crow</l><l part="N">With full voice,
                                            good-for-naught, invites the rain.</l></quote><bibl default="false"><hi rend="italic">ib.</hi> i. 388. </bibl></cit></quote>
                        <pb n="v4-6 p.203"/> If these phenomena are caused by
                            the state of the atmosphere, such an appellation is correct enough. </p></div><div n="16" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> For if tile moon turns red owing to the wind, her hue is certainly a
                            sign of wind. And if, as the same poet infers, <note anchored="true" place="unspecified"> Verg. <hi rend="italic">G.</hi> i. 422. </note>
                            the condensation and rarification of the atmosphere causes that
                                <quote>concert of bird-voices</quote> of which he speaks, we may
                            agree in regarding it as a sign. We may further note that great things
                            are sometimes indicated by trivial signs, witness the Vergilian crow;
                            that trivial events should be indicated by signs of greater importance
                            is of course no matter for wonder. </p></div></div></div></div></body></text></TEI>
                </passage>
            </reply>
            </GetPassage>