Consequently when it is possible to say I have a young son, it is quite superfluous to say, Being desirous of children I took a wife, a son was born whom I acknowledged and reared and brought up to manhood. For this reason some of the Greeks draw a distinction between a concise statement (the word they use is σύντομος ) and a brief statement, the former being free from all superfluous matter, while the latter may conceivably omit something that requires to be stated.

Personally, when I use the word brevity, I mean not saying less, but not saying more than occasion demands. As for repetitions and tautologies and diffuseness, which some writers of textbooks tell us we must avoid, I pass them by; they are faults which we should shun for other reasons beside our desire for brevity.

But we must be equally on our guard against the obscurity which results from excessive abridgment, and it is better to say a little more than is necessary than a little less. For though a diffuse irrelevance is tedious, the omission of what is necessary is positively dangerous.

We must therefore avoid even tile famous terseness of Sallust (though in his case of course it is a merit), and shun all abruptness of speech, since a style which presents no difficulty to a leisurely reader, flies past a hearer and will not stay to be looked at again; and whereas the reader is almost always a man of learning, the judge often comes to his panel from the country side and is expected to give a decision on what he can understand. Consequently we must aim, perhaps everywhere, but above all in our statement of facts, at striking the happy mean in our language, and the happy mean may be defined as saving just what is necessary and just what is sufficient.

By just what is necessary I mean not the bare minimum necessary to convey our meaning; for our brevity must not be devoid of elegance, without which it would be merely uncouth: pleasure beguiles the attention, and that which delights us ever seems less long, just as a picturesque and easy journey tires us less for all its length than a difficult short cut through an arid waste.

And I would never carry my desire for brevity so far as to refuse admission to details which may contribute to the plausibility of our narrative. Simplify and curtail your statement of facts in every direction and you will turn it into something more like a confession. Moreover, the circumstances of the case will often necessitate a long statement of facts, in which case, as I have already enjoined, the judge should be prepared for it at the conclusion of the exordium. Next we must put forth all our art either to shorten it or to render it less tedious.

We must do what we can to make it less long by postponing some points, taking care however to mention what it is that we propose to postpone. Take the following as an example. As regards his motives for killing him, his accomplices and the manner in which he disposed his ambush, I will speak when I come to the proof. Some things indeed may be omitted altogether from our marshalling of the facts, witness the following example from Cicero, pro Caec. iv. 11. Fulcinius died; there are many circumstances which attended that event, but as they have little bearing on this case, I shall pass them by. Division of our statement into its various heads is another method of avoiding tedium: for example, I will tell you first what preceded this affair, then what occurred in its actual development, and finally you shall hear its sequel.

Such a division will give the impression of three short statements rather than of one long one. At times it will be well to interrupt our narrative by interjecting some brief remark like the following: You have heard what happened before: now learn what follows. The judge will be refreshed by the fact that we have brought our previous remarks to a close and will prepare himself for what may be regarded as a fresh start.

If however after employing all these artifices our array of facts is still long, it will not be without advantage to append a summary at the end of it as a reminder: Cicero does this even at the close of a brief statement of facts in the pro Ligario: pro Lig. ii. 4. To this day, Caesar, Quintus Ligarius is free from all blame: he left his home not merely without the least intention of joining in any war, but when there was not the least suspicion of any war etc.

The statement of fact will be credible, if in the first place we take care to say nothing contrary to nature, secondly if we assign reasons and motives for the facts on which the inquiry turns (it is unnecessary to do so with the subsidiary facts as well), and if we make the characters of the actors in keeping with the facts we desire to be believed: we shall for instance represent a person accused of theft as covetous, accused of adultery as lustful, accused of homicide as rash, or attribute the opposite qualities to these persons if we are defending them: further we must do the same with place, time and the like.

It is also possible to treat the subject in such a way as to give it an air of credibility, as is done in comedy and farce. For some things have such natural sequence and coherence that, if only the first portion of your statement is satisfactory, the judge will himself anticipate what you have got to say in the later part.

It will also be useful to scatter some hints of our proofs here and there, but in such a way that it is never forgotten that we are making a statement of facts and not a proof. Sometimes, however, we must also support our assertions by a certain amount of argument, though this must be short and simple: for instance in a case of poisoning we shall say, He was perfectly well when he drank, he fell suddenly to the ground, and blackness and swelling of the body immediately supervened.

The same result is produced by preparatory remarks such as the following: The accused is a strong man and was fully armed, while his opponents were weak, unarmed and suspecting no evil. We may in fact touch on everything that we propose to produce in our proof; while making our statement of facts, as for instance points connected with persons, cause, place, time, the instrument and occasion employed.

Sometimes, when this resource is unavailable, we may even confess that the charge, though true, is scarcely credible, and that therefore it must be regarded as all the more atrocious; that we do not know how the deed was done or why, that we are filled with amazement, but will prove our case.

The best kind of preparatory remarks are those which cannot be recognised as such: Cicero, pro Mil. x. 28. for instance, is extraordinarily happy in the way he mentions in advance everything that shows that Clodius lay in wait for Milo and not Milo for Clodius. The most effective stroke of all is his cunning feint of simplicity: Milo, on the other hand, having been in the senate all day till the house rose, went home, changed his shoes and clothes, and waited for a short time, while his wife was getting ready, as is the way with women.

What an absence of haste and premeditation this gives to Milo's proceedings. And the great orator secures this effect not merely by producing facts which indicate the slow and tardy nature of Milo's departure, but by the use of the ordinary language of everyday speech and a careful concealment of his art. Had he spoken otherwise, his words would by their very sound have warned the judge to keep an eye on the advocate.

The majority of readers regard this passage as lacking in distinction, but this very fact merely serves to show how the art which is scarce detected by a reader succeeded in hoodwinking the judge. It is qualities of this kind that make the statement of facts credible.

If a student requires to be told that we must avoid contradiction and inconsistency in our statement of facts, it will be vain to attempt to instruct him on the remaining points, although some writers of text-books produce this precept as if it were a mystery only discovered by their own personal penetration.

To these three qualities some add magnificence of diction or μεγαλοπρέπεια as they call it this quality is not, however, suitable to all cases. For what place has language that rises above the ordinary level in the majority of private suits dealing with loans, letting and hiring and interdicts? Nor yet is it always expedient, as may be inferred from the passage just cited from the pro Milone.

We must remember, too, that there are many cases in which confession, excuse or modification are necessary with regard to our statements: and magnificence is a quality wholly out of keeping with such procedure. Magnificence of diction is therefore no more specially appropriate to the statement of facts than language calculated to excite pity or hatred, or characterised by dignity, charm or wit. Each of these qualities is admirable in its proper place, but none can be regarded as the peculiar and inalienable property of this portion of the speech.