We shall, as I have already said, never argue points in the statement of facts, but we may sometimes introduce arguments, as for example Cicero does in the pro Ligario, ii. 4. Ligarius was accused of having fought for the Pompeians in Africa. Cicero points out that he went out to Africa before the outbreak of war was dreamed of and that his whole attitude was discreet. when he says that he ruled his province in such a way that it was to his interest that peace should continue. We shall sometimes also, if occasion demand, insert a brief defence of the facts in the statement and trace the reasons that led up to them.

For we must state our facts like advocates, not witnesses. A statement in its simplest form will run as follows, Quintus Ligarius went out as legate to C. Considius. But how will Cicero pro Lig. i. 2. put it ? Quintus Ligarius, he says, set out for Africa as legate to Gaius Considius at a time when there was no thought of war. And again elsewhere ib. ii. 4.

he says, Not only not to war, but to a country where there was no thought of war. And when the sense would have been sufficiently clear had he said no more than Quintus Ligarius would not suffer himself to be entangled in any transaction, pro Lig. i. 3. he adds for he had his eyes fixed on home and wished to return to his own people. Thus he made what he stated credible by giving a reason for it and at the same time coloured it with emotion.

I am therefore all the more surprised at those who hold that there should be no appeal to the emotions in the statement of facts. If they were to say Such appeals should be brief and not on the scale on which they are employed in tile peroration, I should agree with them; for it is important that the statement should be expeditious. But why, while I am instructing the judge, should I refuse to move him as well?

Why should I not, if it is possible, obtain that effect at the very opening of the case which I am anxious to secure at its conclusion, more especially in view of the fact that I shall find the judge far more amenable to the cogency of my proof, if I have previously filled his mind with anger or pity?

Does not Cicero, Verr. v 62. A Roman citizen might not be scourged. cp. St. Paul. in his description of the scourging of a Roman citizen, in a few brief words stir all the emotions, not merely by describing the victim's position, the place where the outrage was committed and the nature of the punishment, but also by praising the courage with which he bore it? For he shows us a man of the highest character who, when beaten with rods, uttered not a moan nor an entreaty, but only cried that lie was a Roman citizen, thereby bringing shame on his oppressor and showing his confidence in the law.

Again does he not throughout the whole of his statement excite the warmest indignation at the misfortunes of Philodamus ib. i. 30 and move us even to tears when he speaks of his punishment and describes, or rather shows us as in a picture, the father weeping for the death of his son and the son for the death of his father?

What can any peroration present that is more calculated to stir our pity? If you wait for the peroration to stir your hearer's emotions over circumstances which you have recorded unmoved in your statement of facts, your appeal will come too late. The judge is already familiar with them and hears their mention without turning a hair, since he was unstirred when they were first recounted to him. Once the habit of mind is formed, it is hard to change it.