In actual deliberations the case is different, and consequently
Theophrastus laid it down that in the deliberative class of oratory the language should as far as
possible be free from all affectation: in stating this view he followed
the authority of his instructor, although as a rule he is not afraid to
differ from him. For Aristotle Rhet. iii. 12.
held that the demonstrative type of oratory was
the best suited for writing and that the next best was forensic oratory: his reason for this view was that the first
type is entirely concerned with display, while the second requires art,
which will even be employed to deceive the audience, if expedience
should so demand, whereas advice requires only truth and prudence.
I agree with this view as regards demonstrative
oratory (in fact all writers are agreed on this point), but as regards
forensic and deliberative themes I think that the style must be suited to
the requirements of the subject which has to be treated.
For I notice that the Philippics of Demosthenes
are pre-eminent for the same merits as his forensic speeches, and that
the opinions expressed by Cicero before the senate or the people are as
remarkable for the splendour of their eloquence as the speeches which he
delivered in accusing or defending persons before the courts. And yet
Cicero Part.
or. xxvii. 97. deliberative oratory that the whole speech should be simple
and dignified, and should derive its ornament rather from the sentiments
expressed than the actual words.
As regards the use of examples practically all authorities are with good
reason agreed that there is no subject to which they are better suited,
since as a
Brevity and copiousness are determined not so much by the nature as by
the compass of the subject. For, just as in deliberations the question is generally less complicated, so
in forensic cases it is often of less importance.
Anyone who is content to read not merely speeches, but history as well,
in preference to growing grey over the notebooks of the rhetoricians,
will realise the truth of what I say: for in the historians the speeches
delivered to the people and the opinions expressed in the senate often
provide examples of advice and dissuasion.
he will find an avoidance of abrupt openings in deliberatire speeches and will note that the forensic style is often the more impetuous of the two, while
in both cases the words are suited to the matter and forensic speeches are often shorter than deliberative.
Nor will he find in them those faults into which some of our declaimers fall, namely a coarse abuse of those who hold opposite opinions and a general tendency to speak in such a way as to make it seem that the speaker's views are in opposition to those of the persons who ask his advice. Consequently their aim seems to be invective rather than persuasion.
I would have my younger readers realise that these words are penned for
their special benefit that they may not desire to adopt a different
style in their exercises from that in which they will be required to
speak, and may not be hampered by having to unlearn what they have
acquired. For the rest if they are ever summoned to take part in the
counsels of their friends, or to speak their opinions in the senate, or
advise the emperor on some point on which he
IX. I now come to the forensic kind of
oratory, which presents the utmost variety, but whose duties are no more
than two, the bringing and rebutting of charges. Most authorities divide
the forensic speech into five parts: the exordium, the statement of facts, the
proof, the refutation,
and the peroration. To these some have added the
partition into heads, proposition and digression, the two first of which form part of
the proof.
For it is obviously necessary to propound what
you are going to prove as well as to conclude.
Why then, if proposition is a part of a speech,
should not conclusion be also? Partition on the other hand is merely one aspect of arrangement, and arrangement is a part of rhetoric itself, and is equally
distributed through every theme of oratory and their whole body, just as
are invention and style.
Consequently we must regard partition not as one
part of a whole speech, but as a part of each individual question that
may be involved. For what question is there in which an orator cannot
set forth the order in which he is going to make his points? And this of
course is the function of partition. But how
ridiculous it is to make each question an aspect of proof, but partition which is an aspect
of a question a part of the whole speech.
As for digression (egressio, now more usually
styled excessus ), if it lie outside the case, it
cannot be part of it, while, if it lie within it, it is merely an
accessory or ornament of that portion of the case from which digression is made. For if anything that lies
within the case is to be called part of it, why not argument, comparison, commonplace, pathos,
illustration parts of the case?
On the other hand I disagree with those who, like Aristotle, Rhet. ii.
26. refuation from the
list on the ground that it forms part of the proof: for the proof is constructive,
and the reputation destructive. Aristotle Rhet.
iii. 13. proposition, not statement
of facts, follow the exordium. This
however he does because he regards proposition as
the genus and statement of
facts as the species, with the result
that he holds that, whereas the former is always and everywhere
necessary, the latter may sometimes be dispensed with.
It is however necessary to point out as regards these five parts which I have established, that that which has to be spoken first is not necessarily that which requires our first consideration. But above all we must consider the nature of the case, the question at issue and the arguments for and against. Next we must consider what points are to be made, and what refuted, and then how the facts are to be stated.
For the stalement of facts is designed to prepare
the way for the proofs and must needs be
unprofitable, unless we have first determined what proofs. are to be promised in the statement. Finally we must consider how best to win the judge
to take our view. For we cannot be sure until we have subjected all the
parts of the case to careful scrutiny, what sort of impression we wish
to make upon the judge: are we to mollify him or increase his severity,
to excite or relax his interest in the case, to render him susceptible
to influence or the reverse?
I cannot however approve the view of those who exordium should actually be
written last. For though we must collect all our material and determine
the proper place for each portion of it, before we begin to speak or
write, we must commence with what naturally comes first.
No one begins a portrait by painting or modelling the feet, and no art finds its completion at the point where it should begin. Otherwise what will happen if we have not time to write our speech? Will not the result of such a reversal of the proper order of things be that we shall be caught napping? We must therefore review the subject-matter in the order laid down, but write our speech in the order in which we shall deliver it.
X. Every cause in which one side attacks and the other defends
consists either of one or more controversial questions. In the first
case it is called simple, in the second complex. An example of the first is when the
subject of enquiry is a theft or an adultery taken by itself. In complex cases the several questions may all be of
the same kind, as in cases of extortion, or of different kinds, as when
a man is accused at one and the same time of homicide and sacrilege.
Such cases no longer arise in the public courts, since the praetor
allots the different charges to different courts in accordance with a
definite rule; but they still are of frequent occurrence in the Imperial
or Senatorial courts, and were frequent in the days when they came up
for trial before the people. quaestiones
perpetuae ). There were separate courts for, different
offences. In cases brought before the Senate or the Emperor a number
of different charges might be dealt with at once.
There are no other species of forensic causes,
not even when one person brings the same suit on the same grounds
against two different