Sometimes again we urge good men to adopt a somewhat unseemly course, while we advise men of poor character to take a course in which the object is the advantage of those who seek our advice. I realise the thought that will immediately occur to my reader: Do you then teach that this should be done or think it right? Cicero The letter is lost. the argument of the quotation is as follows. The policy which I advise is honorable, but it would be wrong for me to urge Caesar to follow it, since it is contrary to his interests. might clear me from blame in the matter; for he writes to Brutus in the following terms, after setting forth a number of things that might honourably be urged on Caesar: Should I be a good man to advise this? No. For the end of him who gives advice is the advantage of the man to whom he gives it. But, you say, your advice is right. Certainly, but there is not always room for what is right in giving advice. However, this is a somewhat abstruse question, and does not concern deliberative oratory alone. I shall therefore reserve it for my twelfth and concluding book. Chap. xii.

For my part I would not have anything done dishonourably. But for the meantime let us regard these questions as at least belonging to the rhetorical exercises of the schools: for knowledge of evil is necessary to enable us the better to defend what is right.

For the present I will only say that if anyone is going to urge a dishonourable course on honourable man, he should remember not to urge it as being dishonourable, and should avoid the practice of certain declaimers who urge Sextus Pompeius to piracy just because it is dishonourable and cruel. Even when we address bad men, we should gloss over what is unsightly. For there is no man so evil as to wish to seem so.

Thus Sallust makes Catiline Cat. xx. speak as one who is driven to crime not by wickedness but by indignation, and Varius makes Atreus say: My wrongs are past all speech,And such shall be the deeds they force me to. How much more has this pretence of honour to be kept up by those who have a real regard for their own good name!

Therefore when we advise Cicero to beg Antonius for mercy or even to burn the Philippics if Antonius promises to spare him on that condition, For examples of this theme see the elder Seneca ( Suas. vi. and vii.). we shall not empliasise the love of life in our advice (for if that passion has any force with him, it will have it none the less if we are silent), but we shall exhort him to save himself in the interest of the state.

For he needs some such reason as that to preserve him from feeling shame at entreating such a one as Antony. Again if we urge Gaius Caesar Julius Caesar. to accept the crown we shall assert that the state is doomed to destruction unless controlled by a monarchy. For the sole aim of the man who is deliberating about committing a criminal act is to make his act appear as little wicked as possible.

It also makes a great deal of difference who it is that is offering the advice: for if his past has been illustrious, or if his distinguished birth or age or fortune excite high expectations, care must be taken that his words are not unworthy of him. If on the other hand he has none of these advantages he will have to adopt a humbler tone. For what is regarded as liberty in some is called licence in others. Some receive sufficient support from their personal authority, while others find that the force of reason itself is scarce sufficient to enable them to maintain their position.

Consequently I regard impersonation as the most difficult of tasks, imposed as it is in addition to the other work involved by a deliberative theme. For the same speaker has on one occasion to impersonate Caesar, on another Cicero or Cato. But it is a most useful exercise because it demands a double effort and is also of the greatest use to future poets and historians, while for orators of course it is absolutely necessary.

For there are many speeches composed by Greek and Latin orators for others to deliver, the words of which had to be adapted to suit the position and character of those for whom they were written. Do you suppose that Cicero thought in the same way or assumed the same character when he wrote for Gnaeus Pompeius and when he wrote for Titus Ampius and the rest? Nothing is known of these speeches. Did he not rather bear in mind the fortune, rank and achievements of each single individual and represent the character of all to whom he gave a voice so that though they spoke better than they could by nature, they still might seem to speak in their own persons?

For a speech which is out of keeping with the man who delivers it is just as faulty as the speech which fails to suit the subject to which it should conform. It is for this reason that Lysias is regarded as having shown the highest art in the speeches which he wrote for uneducated persons, on account of their extraordinary realism. In the case of declaimers indeed it is of the first importance that they should consider what best suits each character: for they rarely play the role of advocates in their declamations. As a rule they impersonate sons, parents, rich men, old men, gentle or harsh of temper, misers, superstitious persons, cowards and mockers, so that hardly even comic actors have to assume more numerous roles in their performances on the stage than these in their declamations.

All these rôles may be regarded as forming part of impersonation, which I have included under delibertive themes, from which it differs merely in that it involves the assumption of a role. It is sometimes introduced even with controversial themes, which are drawn from history and involve the appearance of definite historical characters as pleaders.

I am aware also that historical and poetical themes are often set for the sake of practice, such as Priam's speech to Achilles or Sulla's address to the people on his resignation of the dictatorship. But these will fall under one or other of the three classes into which I have divided causes. For entreaty, statement, and argument, with other themes already mentioned, are all of frequent occurrence in forensic, deliberative or demonstrative subjects, according as circumstances demand,

and we often introduce fictitious speeches of historical persons, whom we select ourselves. Cicero for instance in the pro Caelio xiv. sqq makes both Appius Caecus and her brother Clodius address Clodia, the former rebuking her for her immorality, the latter exhorting her thereto.

In scholastic declamations the fictitious themes for deliberative speeches are often not unlike those of controversial speeches and are a compromise between the two forms, as for instance when the theme set is a discussion in the presence of Gaius Caesar of the punishment to be meted out to Theodotus; for it consists of accusation and defence, both of them peculiar to forensic oratory.

But the topic of expediency also enters into the case, in such questions as whether it was to Caesar's advantage that Pompeius should be slain; whether the execution of Theodotus would involve the risk of a war with the king of Egypt; whether such a war would be highly inopportune at such a critical moment, would prove dangerous and be certain to last a long time.

There is also a question of honour. Does it befit Caesar to avenge Pompeius' death? or is it to be feared that an admission that Pompeius did not deserve death will injure the cause of the Caesarian party?

It may be noted that discussions of such a kind may well occur in actual cases. Declaimers have however often been guilty of an error as regards deliberative themes which has involved a series of consequences. They have considered deliberative themes to be different and absolutely opposed to forensic themes. For they have always affected abrupt openings, an impetuous style and a generous embellishment, as they call it, in their language, and have been especially careful to make shorter notes for deliberative than for forensic themes.

For my part while I realise that deliberative themes do not require an exordium, for reasons which I have already stated, I do not, however, understand why they should open in such a wild and exclamatory manner. When a man is asked to express his opinion on any subject, he does not, if he is sane, begin to shriek, but endeavours as far as possible to win the assent of the man who is considering the question by a courteous and natural opening.

Why, I ask, in review of the fact that deliberations require moderation above all else, should the speaker on such themes indulge in a torrential style of eloquence kept at one high level of violence? I acknowledge that in controversial speeches the tone is often lowered in the exordium, the statement of facts and the argument, and that if you subtract these three portions, the remainder is more or less of the deliberative type of speech, but what remains must likewise be of a more even flow, avoiding all violence and fury.

With regard to manificence of language, deliblerative declaimers should avoid straining after it more than others, but it comes to them more naturally. For there is a preference among those who invent such themes for selecting great personages, such as kings, princes, senators and peoples, while the theme itself is generally on a grander scale. Consequently since the words are suited to the theme, they acquire additional splendour from the magnificence of the matter.