The accuser of course affirms that he has exercised the profession of an actor: the accused denies that he has exercised the profession. The question then arises as to the meaning of the exercise of the profession of actor. If he is accused under the law regarding the seats in the theatre, the denial will proceed from the accused; if on the other hand he is turned out of the theatre and demands compensation for assault, the denial will be made by the accuser.

The view of the majority of writers i.e. that the defendant makes the basis or status. See § 13. on this subject will, however, hold good in most cases. Some have evaded these problems by saying that a basis is that which emerges from affirmations and denials, such as You did it, I did not do it, or I was justified in doing it.

But let us see whether this is the basis itself or rather that in which the basis is to be found. Hermagoras calls a basis that which enables the matter in question to be understood and to which the proofs of the parties concerned will also be directed. My own opinion has always been that, whereas there are frequently different bases of questions in connexion with a cause, the basis of the cause itself is its most important point on which the whole matter turns. If anyone prefers to call that the general question or general head of the cause, I shall not quarrel with him, any more than I have done hitherto if he produced a different technical term to express the same thing, although I know that whole volumes have been written on such disputes. I prefer however to call it the basis.

There is the greatest possible disagreement among writers about this as about everything else, but in this case as elsewhere they seem to me to have been misled by a passion for saying something different from their fellow-teachers. As a result there is still no agreement as to the number and names of bases, nor as to which are general and which special. To begin with Aristotle Categ. ii. 7. lays down that there are ten categories on which every question seems to turn.

First there is οὐσία which Plautus calls essence, the only available translation: under this category we inquire whether a thing is. Secondly there is quality, the meaning of which is self-evident. Third comes quantity, which was subdivided by later philosophers as dealing with two questions as to magnitude and number. Next relation, involving questions of competence See §§ 52, 68 sqq., 84–86, which make the meaning of translatio fairly clear. No exact rendering is satisfactory. Literally it means transference of the charge : the sense is virtually the same as that of exceptio (a plea made by defendant in bar of plaintiff's action). Exception is too unfamiliar and technical a term. Competence, despite its vagueness, is perhaps the least unsatisfactory rendering. and comparison. This is followed by when and where. Then come doing, suffering and possessing,

which for example are concerned with a person's being armed or clothed. Lastly comes κεῖσθαι or position, which means to be in a certain position, such for instance as being warm, standing or angry. Of these categories the first four concern bases, the remainder concern only certain topics for argument.

Others make the number of categories to be nine. Person, involving questions concerning the mind, body or external circumstances, which clearly has reference to the means by which we establish conjecture or quality. Time, or χρόνος, from which we get questions such as whether a child is born a slave, if his mother is delivered of him while assigned addicti were not technically servi, though in a virtual condition of servitude, being the bondsmen of their creditors till their debt was paid. to her creditors. Place, from which we get such disputes as to whether it is permissible to kill a tyrant in a temple, or whether one who has hidden himself at home can be regarded as an exile.

Then comes time in another sense, called καιρός by the Greeks, by which they refer to a period of time, such as summer or winter; under this heading come problems such as that about the man who held high revel in a time of pestilence. There is no other reference to this theme. Action or πρᾶξις, to which they refer questions as to whether an act was committed wittingly or unwittingly, by accident or under compulsion and the like. Number, which falls under the category of quantity, under which come questions such as whether the state owes Thrasybulus thirty talents for ridding it of the same number of tyrants.

Cause, under which heading come a large number of disputes, whenever a fact is not denied, but the defence pleads that the act was just and reasonable. τρόπος or manner, which is involved when a thing is said to have been done in one way when it might have been done in another: under this category come cases of such as that of the adulterer who is scourged with thongs or starved to death. An adulterer caught flagrante delicto might be killed by the husband or beaten. But to starve him to death in cold blood would be illegal. Opportunity for action, the meaning of which is too obvious to need explanation or illustration: the Greeks however call it ἔργων ἀφορμαί

These authorities like Aristotle hold that no question can arise which does not come under one of these heads. Some subtract two of them, namely number and opportunity, and substitute for what I have called action, things, or in Greek πράγματα. I have thought it sufficient to notice these doctrines, for fear someone might complain of their omission. Still I do not consider that bases are sufficiently determined by these categories, nor that the latter cover every possible kind of topic, as will be clear to any that read carefully what I have to say on both points. For there will be found to be many topics that are not covered by these categories.

I find it stated in many authors that some rhetoricians only recognise one kind of basis, the con- jectural. But they have not mentioned who these rhetoricians are nor have I been able to discover. They are however stated to have taken this view on the ground that all our knowledge is a matter of inference from indications. On this line of reasoning they might regard all bases as qualitative, because we inquire into the nature of the subject in every case. But the adoption of either view leads to inextricable confusion.

Nor does it matter whether one recognises only one kind of basis or none at all, if all causes are of the same nature. Coniectura is derived from conicere to throw together, because it implies the concentration of the reason on the truth. For this reason interpreters of dreams and all other phenomena are called coniectores conjecturers. But the conjectural basis has received more names than one, as will appear in the sequel.

Some have recognised only two bases. Archedemus Fr. 11, Arnim. for instance admits only the conjectural and definitive and refuses to admit the qualitative, since he held that questions of quality take the form of What is unfair? what is unjust? what is disobedience? which he terms questions about identity and difference. i.e. the question may be stated Does it conform to our conception of injustice or is it something different? Questions of quality are regarded as questions of definition.

A different view was held by those who likewise only admitted two bases, but made them the negative and juridical. The negative basis is identical with that which we call the conjectural, to which some give the name of negative absolutely, others only in part, these latter holding that conjecture is employed by the accuser, denial only by the accused.

The juridical is that known in Greek as δικαιολογικός But just as Archedemus would not recognise the qualitative basis, so these reject the definitive which they include in the juridical, holding that in these questions we have to enquire whether it is just that the act with which the accused is charged should be called sacrilege or theft or madness.

Pamplihlus held this opinion but subdivided quality into several different species. The majority of later writers have classified bases as follows, involving however no more than a change of names:— those dealing with ascertained facts and those dealing with matters where there is a doubt. For a thing must either be certain or uncertain: if it is uncertain, the basis will be conjectural; if certain, it will be some one of the other bases.

Apollodorus says the same thing when he states that a question must either lie in things external, e.g. circumstantial evidence. which give play to conjecture, or in our own opinions: the former he calls πραγματικός the latter περὶ ἐννοίας The same is said by those who employ the terms ἀπροληπτὸς ἀπροληπτός lit. = unpresumed. and προληπτικός, that is to say doubtful and presumptive, by this latter term meaning those facts which are beyond a doubt.

Theodorus agrees with them, for he holds that the question is either as to whether such and such a thing is really so, or is concerned with the accidents of something which is an admitted fact: that is to say it is either περὶ οὐσίας or περὶ συμβεβηκότων For in all these cases the first basis is conjectural, while the second belongs to one of the other classes. As for these other classes of basis, Apollodorus holds that there are two, one concerned with quality and the other with the names of things, that is to say a definitive basis. Theodorus makes them four, concerned with existence, quality, quantity and relation.