Moreover cause seems to spring from cause, or as the Greeks say αἴτιον ἐξ αἰτίον as will be seen from the following:— Clytemnestra killed Agamemnon, because he had sacrificed their daughter and brought home a captive woman as his paramour. The same authors think that there may be several lines of defence to one question: for instance Orestes may urge that he killed his mother because driven to do so by oracles. But the number of points for the decision of the judge will be the same as the number of alleged motives for the deed: in this case it will be whether he ought to have obeyed the oracles.

But one alleged motive may also in my opinion involve several questions and several points for the decision of the judge, as for instance in the case when the husband caught his wife in adultery and slew her and later slew the adulterer, who had escaped, in the market place. The motive is but one: he was an adulterer. But there arise as questions and points for decision by the judge, whether it was lawful to kill him at that time and at that place.

But just as, although there be several questions, each with its special basis, the basis of the case is but one, namely that to which all else is referred, even so the real point for the decision of the judge is, strictly speaking, that on which judgment is given.

As for the σύνεχον the central argument, as I have mentioned it is called by some, or the foundation as it is called by others, or as Cicero De Inv. I. xiv. 19. styles it the strongest argument of the defender and the most relevant to the decision of the judge, some regard it as being the point after which all enquiry ceases, others as the main point for adjudication.

The motive of the deed does not arise in all controversial cases. For how can there be a motive for the deed, when the deed is denied? But when the motive for the deed does come up for discussion, they deny that the point for the decision of the judge rests on the same ground as the main question at issue, and this view is maintained by Cicero De Inv. I. c.: Part. Or. xxx. 104. in his Rhetorica and Partitiones.