Others again use illustrations such as the following:— He who has spent his patrimony, is not allowed to address the people. But he spent it on public works. The question is whether everyone that spends his patrimony is to be prohibited, while the point for decision is whether he who spent it in such a way is to be prohibited.

Or again take the case of the soldier Arruntius, who killed the tribune Lusius for assaulting his honour. The question is whether he was justified in so doing, the line of defence, that the murdered man made an assault upon his honour, the point for the decision of the judge, whether it was right that a man should be killed uncondemned or a tribune by a soldier.

Some even regard the basis of the question as being different from the basis of the decision. The question as to whether Milo was justified in killing Clodius, is one of quality. The point for the decision of the judge, namely whether Clodius lay in wait for Milo, is a matter for conjecture.

They also urge that a case is often diverted to the consideration of some matter irrelevant to the question, and that it is on this matter that judgment is given. I strongly disagree. Take the question whether all who have spent their patrimony are to be prohibited from addressing the people. This question must have its point for decision, and therefore the question and the point for decision are not different, but there are more than one question and more than one point for decision in the case. Again, in the case of Milo,

is not the question of fact ultimately referred to the question of quality ? For if Clodius lay in wait for Milo, it follows that he was justifiably killed. But when the case is shifted to some other point far removed from the original question, even in this case the question will be found to reside in the point for decision.

As regards these questions Cicero is slightly inconsistent with himself. For in the Rhetorica, as I have already mentioned, he followed Hermagoras, while in the Topicai Top. xxv. 95. he holds that the κρινόμενον or disputed point is originated by the basis, and in addressing the lawyer Trebatius on this subject he calls it the point at issue, and describes the elements in which it resides as central arguments or foundations of the defence which hold it together and the removal of which causes the whole defence to fall to the ground.

But in the Partitiones Oratoriae xxix. 103. he gives the name of foundation to that which is advanced against the defence, on the ground that the central argument, as it logically comes first, is put forward by the accuser, while the line of defence is put forward by the accused, and the point for the decision of the judge arises from the question jointly raised by the central argument and the line of defence. The view therefore of those who make the basis, the central argument, and the point for the decision of the judge identical, is at once more concise and nearer to the truth. The central argument, they point out, is that the removal of which makes the whole case fall to the ground.

In this central argument they seem to me to have included both the alleged causes, that Orestes killed his mother and that Clytemnestra killed Agamemnon. the same authorities have likewise always held that the basis and the point for the decision of the judge are in agreement; any other opinion would have been inconsistent with their general views.