Sometimes, again, it will beseem us to spare or seem to spare our inferiors, more especially if they be young. Cicero See opening sections of pro Caclio. gives an example of such moderation in the way in which he deals with Atratinus in his defence of Caelius: he does not lash him like an enemy, but admonishes him almost like a father. For Atratinus was of noble birth and young, and the grievance which led him to bring the accusation was not unreasonable. But the task is comparatively easy in those cases in which it is to the judge, or even, it may be, to our audience that we have to indicate the reason for our moderation. The real difficulty arises when we are afraid of offending those against whom we are speaking.

The difficulties of Cicero when defending Murena were increased by the fact that he was opposed by two persons of this character, namely Marcus Cato and Servius Sulpicius. And yet in what courteous language, after allowing Sulpicius all the virtues, he refuses to admit that he has any idea of the way to conduct a candidature for the consulship. Pro Muren. vii. 15. What else was there in which a man of high birth and a distinguished lawyer would sooner admit his inferiority? With what skill he sets forth his reasons for undertaking the defence of Murena, when he says that he supported Sulpicius' candidature as opposed to that of Murena, but did not regard that preference as reason why he should support him in bringing a capital charge against his rival!

And with what a light touch he deals with Cato! Pro Muren. xxix. 60. He has the highest admiration for his character and desires to show that the fact that in certain respects it has become severe and callous is due not to any personal fault, but to the influence of the Stoic school of philosophy; in fact you would imagine that they were engaged not in a forensic dispute, but merely in some philosophical discussion.

This is undoubtedly the right method, and the safest rule in such cases will be to follow the practice of Cicero, namely, that, when we desire to disparage a man without giving offence, we should allow him to be the possessor of all other virtues and point out that it is only in this one respect that he falls short of his high standard, while we should, if possible, add some reason why this should be so, such, for example, as his being too obstinate or credulous or quick to anger, or acting under the influence of others.

(For we may generally find a way out of such embarrassments by making it clear throughout our whole speech that we not merely honour the object of our criticism, but even regard him with affection.) Further, we should have good cause for speaking thus and must do so not merely with moderation, but also give the impression that our action is due to the necessities of the case.

A different situation arises, but an easier one, when we have to praise the actions of men who are otherwise disreputable or hateful to ourselves: for it is only right that we should award praise where it is deserved, whatever the character of the person praised may be. Cicero spoke in defence of Gabinius and Publius Vatinius, both of them his deadly enemies and men against whom he had previously spoken and even published his speeches: but he justifies himself by declaring that he does so not because he is anxious for his reputation as an accomplished speaker, but because he is concerned for his honour.

He had a more difficult task in his defence of Cluentius, Ch. 17 sqq. as it was necessary for him to denounce Scamander's guilt, although he had previously appeared for him. But he excuses his action with the utmost grace, alleging the importunity of those persons who had brought Scamander to him, and his own youth at the time, whereas it would have been a serious blot on his reputation, especially in connexion with a case of the most dubious character, if he had admitted that he was one who was ready to undertake the defence of guilty persons without asking awkward questions.

On the other hand, when we are pleading before a judge, who has special reasons for being hostile to us or is for some personal motive ill-disposed to the cause which we have undertaken, although it may be difficult to persuade him, the method which we should adopt in speaking is simple enough: we shall pretend that our confidence in his integrity and in the justice of our cause is such that we have no fears. We must play upon his vanity by pointing out that the less he indulges his own personal enmity or interest, the greater will be the reputation for conscientious rectitude that will accrue to him from his verdict.

The same method may be adopted if our case should chance to be sent back to the same judges from whom we have appealed: but we may further, if the case should permit, plead that we were forced to take the action which we did or were led to it by error or suspicion. I.e. apologise for refusing to accept his original judgement. The safest course will therefore be to express our regret, apologise for our fault and employ every means to induce the judge to feel compunction for his anger.

It will also sometimes happen that a judge may have to try the same case on which he has previously given judgment. In such circumstances the method commonly adopted is to say that we should not have ventured to dispute his sentence before any other judge, since he alone would be justified in revising it: but (and in this we must be guided by the circumstances of the case) we may allege that certain facts were not known on the previous occasion or certain witnesses were unavailable, or, though this must be advanced with the utmost caution and only in the last resort, that our clients' advocates were unequal to their task.

And even if we have to plead a case afresh before different judges, as may occur in a second trial of a claim to freedom or in cases in the centumviral courts, which are divided between two different panels, it will be most seemly, if we have lost our case before the first panel, to say nothing against the judges who tried the case on that occasion. But this is a subject with which I dealt at some length in the passage where I discussed proofs. ii. 1, where, as here, it is indicated that different portions of a case might be tried by two panels of centumviri sitting separately. The centumviral court dealt mainly with cases of inheritance. It may happen that we have to censure actions in others, of which we have been guilty ourselves, as, for example, when Tubero charges Ligarius with having been in Africa.

Again, there have been cases where persons condemned for bribery have indicted others for the same offence with a view to recovering their lost position: See v. x. 108 note and with reference to pro Clu. xxxvi. 98. for this the schools provide a parallel in the theme where a luxurious youth accuses his father of the same offence. I do not see how this can be done with decorum unless we succeed in discovering some difference between the two cases, such as character, age, motives, circumstances of time and place or intention.

Tubero, for example, alleges that he was a young man at the time and went thither in the company of his father, who had been sent by the senate not to take part in the war, but to purchase corn, and further that he left the party as soon as he could, whereas Ligarius clung to the party and gave his support, not to Gnaeus Pompeius, who was engaged with Caesar in a struggle for the supreme power, though both wished to preserve the state, but to Juba and the Africans who were the sworn enemies of Rome.