Now since, O Titus Attius, I replied to everything which was said by you concerning the condemnation of Oppianicus, you must inevitably confess that you were very much deceived when you thought that I would defend the cause of Aulus Cluentius, not by arguing on his own actions, but on the law. For you very often said that you had been informed that I intended to defend this action, relying on the protection of the law. Is it so? Are we, then, without knowing it, betrayed by our friends? and is there some one among those whom we think our friends, who carries intelligence of our plans to our adversaries? Who reported this to you? Who was so dishonest? But to whom did I tell it? No one I imagine, is in fault; but in truth it was the law itself which suggested this to you. But do I appear to have defended it in such a way as to have made throughout the whole case the least mention of the law? Do I appear to have defended this cause differently from the way in which I should have defended it if Habitus had been guilty by law, supposing the facts to be proved? Certainly, as far as a man may assert a thing positively, I have omitted no opportunity of clearing him from the odious imputation sought to be cast on him.

What do I mean, then? Some one will ask, perhaps, whether I have any objection to ward off danger from a client's life by the protection with which the law supplies me? I have no objection at all, O judges; but I adhere to my own plan of action. In a trial in which all honourable and a wise man is concerned, I have been accustomed, not only to consult my own judgment, but very much also to be guided by the judgment and inclination of him whom I am defending. For when this cause was brought to me, as to a person who ought to know the laws on which we are employed, and to which we devote ourselves, I said at once to Habitus that he was perfectly safe from the law about “those who conspired together to procure a man's condemnation;” but that our order was liable to be impeached under that law. And he began to beg and entreat me not to defend him by urging points of law. And when I said what I thought, he brought me over to his opinion; for he affirmed with tears that he was not more desirous of retaining his freedom as a citizen, than of preserving his character.