Brutus assembled his army and addressed it as follows: "In yesterday's engagement, fellow-soldiers, you were in every respect superior to the enemy. You began the battle eagerly, although without orders, and you utterly destroyed their far-famed fourth legion, on which their wing placed its reliance, and all those supporting it as far as their camp, and you took and plundered their camp first, so that our victory far outweighs the disaster on our left wing. When it was in your power to finish the whole work, you chose rather to plunder than to kill the vanquished. Most of you passed by the enemy and made a rush for his property. We are the superior again in this, that of our two camps they captured only one, while we took all of theirs, so that here our gain is twice as great as our loss. So great are our advantages in the battle. How far we excel them in other respects you may learn from our prisoners -- concerning the scarcity and dearness of provisions among them, the difficulty of procuring further supplies, and how near they are to absolute want. They can obtain nothing from Sicily, Sardinia, Africa, or Spain, because Pompeius, Murcus, and Ahenobarbus with 260 ships close the sea against them. They have already exhausted Macedonia. They are now dependent on Thessaly alone. How much longer will it suffice?

"When, therefore, you see them eager to fight, bear in mind that they are so pressed by hunger that they prefer death by battle. We will make it part of our plan that hunger shall engage them before we do, so that when it is necessary to fight we shall find them weakened and exhausted. Let us not be carried away by our ardor before the proper time. Let no one think that delay implies want of generalship more than haste,*mhde\ braduth=ta/ tis h(gei/sqw th\n e)mpeiri/an h)/ taxuth=ta. The text is probably corrupt at this place. Various suggestions have been made for its amendment. In the edition of Tollius a)peiri/an (want of seneralship) is suggested in place of e)mpeiri/an. This solves the difficulty with the least possible change of the text. when he casts his eye on the sea behind us, which sends us aid and provisions and enables us to win victory without danger if we wait and do not mind the insults and provocations of the enemy, who are not braver than ourselves, as yesterday's work shows, but are trying to avert another danger. Let the zeal which I now desire you to repress be shown abundantly when I ask it. The rewards of victory I will pay you in full when it shall please the gods that our work be finished. And now for your bravery in yesterday's engagement, I will give to each soldier 1000 drachmas and to your officers in proportion." After speaking thus he distributed the donative to the legions in their order. Some writers say that he promised to give them also the cities of Lacedæmon and Thessalonica to plunder.

Octavius and Antony, seeing that Brutus was not willing to fight, assembled their men, and Antony addressed them thus: "Soldiers, I am sure that the enemy claim in their speeches a share of yesterday's victory because they drove some of us and plundered our camp, but they will show by their action that it was wholly yours. I promise you that neither to-morrow nor on any subsequent day will they be willing to fight. It is the clearest proof of their defeat yesterday and of their lack of courage that, like those who have been vanquished in public games, they keep out of the arena. Surely they did not collect so numerous an army in order to pass their time in fortifications in the desert parts of Thrace. They built their fortifications when you were still approaching because they were afraid. Now that you have come they adhere to them because of yesterday's defeat, on which account also the older and more experienced of their generals in utter despair committed suicide, and this act is itself the greatest proof of their disaster. Since, therefore, they do not accept our challenge and come down from the mountain, but trust to their rocky fastnesses instead of their arms, be valliant, O my soldiers of Rome, and force them to it again as you forced them yesterday. Let us consider it base to yield to those who are afraid of us, to keep our hands off such sluggards, or, soldiers as we are, to be unequal to the capture of their fortifications. We did not come hither to pass our lives in this plain, and if we delay we shall be in want of everything. If we are well advised we shall prosecute the war sharply, in order that peace may be of the longest duration possible.

"We, who have not incurred your censure for the onset and the plan of yesterday's battle, will devise fresh opportunities and means for this end. You, on the other hand, when you are asked, repay your generals with your valor. Nor will you be troubled, after a little, by yesterday's plundering of our camp, for our wealth consists not in the property we hold, but in conquering with might, which will restore to us as victors not only what we lost yesterday, which is still safe in the enemy's possession, but the enemy's wealth in addition. And if we are in hastekai\ ei) e)peigo/meqa. Nauck suggests eu)xo/meqa in place of the last word, so that it would read "if we wish to take these things let us hasten to bring on a battle." to take these things let us hasten to bring on a battle. What we took from them yesterday balances what we lost, and perhaps more, for they brought with them all that they had extorted and plundered from Asia, while we, coming from our own country, left at home everything in the way of luxury, and brought with us only what was necessary. If there was anything lavish in our camp it was the property of your generals, who will gladly give it all to you as a reward for your victory. And as compensation for your losses we will give you an additional reward of 5000 drachmas for each soldier, five times as much to each centurion, and twice the latter sum to each tribune."

Having spoken thus, he led out his men again on the following day. As the enemy would not come down then, Antony was disgusted, but he continued to lead out his men daily. Brutus had a part of his army in line lest he should be compelled to fight; and with another part he guarded the road by which his supplies were conveyed. There was a hill very near the camp of Cassius, which it was difficult for an enemy to occupy because, by reason of its nearness, it was exposed to arrows from the camp. Nevertheless, Cassius had placed a guard on it, lest it should be forced unexpectedly. As it had been abandoned by Brutus, the army of Octavius occupied it by night with four legions and protected themselves with wickerwork and hides against the enemy's bowmen. When this position was secured they transferred ten other legions a distance of more than five stades toward the sea. Four stades farther they placed two legions, in order to extend themselves in this manner quite to the sea, with a view of breaking through the enemy's line either along the sea itself, or through the marsh, or in some other way, and to cut off their supplies. Brutus counteracted this movement by building fortified posts opposite their camps and in other ways.

The task of Octavius and Antony became pressing, hunger was already felt, and fear fell upon them more and more each day,e)/s te me/geqos kai\ de/os e(ka/sths h(me/ras e)pegi/gneto: an obscure passage. The translation is in part conjecture. for Thessaly could no longer furnish sufficient supplies, nor could they hope for anything from the sea, which was commanded by the enemy everywhere. News of their recent disaster in the Adriatic having now reached both armies,Plutarch says expressly that Brutus was not aware of this disaster to his enemies; for, although a deserter from the camp of Octavius came to tell the news, he was not believed, and was not allowed to see Brutus at all. () it caused them fresh alarm, as also did the approach of winter while they were quartered in this muddy plain. Moved by these considerations they sent a legion of troops to Achaia to collect all the food they could find and send it to them in haste. As they could not rest under so great an impending danger, and as their other artifices were of no avail, they ceased offering battle in the plain and advanced with shouts to the enemy's fortifications, and challenged Brutus to fight, reviling and scoffing at him, intending not so much to besiege him as by a mad rush to bring him to an engagement against his will.

Brutus adhered to his original intention, and all the more because he knew of the famine and of his own success in the Adriatic, and of the enemy's desperation for want of supplies. He preferred to endure a siege, or anything else, rather than come to an engagement with men who were famishing, and whose hopes rested solely on fighting because they despaired of every other resource. His soldiers, however, without reflection, entertained a different opinion. They took it hard that they should be shut up, idle and cowardly, like women, within their fortifications. Their officers, although they approved of Brutus' design, were vexed, thinking that in the present temper of the army they might overpower the enemy more quickly. Brutus himself was the cause of these murmurs, being of a gentle and kindly disposition toward all -- not like Cassius, who was austere and imperious in every way, for which reason the army obeyed his orders promptly, not interfering with his authority, not inquiring the reasons for his orders, and not criticising them when they had learned them. But in the case of Brutus they expected nothing else than to share the command with him on account of his mildness of temper. Finally, the soldiers began openly to collect together in companies and groups and to ask each other, "Why does our general put a stigma upon us? How have we offended lately -- we who conquered the enemy and put him to flight; we who slaughtered those opposed to us and took their camp?" Brutus took no notice of these murmurs, nor did he call an assembly, lest he should be forced from his position, contrary to his dignity, by the unreasoning multitude, and especially by the mercenaries, who, like fickle slaves seeking new masters, always rest their hopes of safety on desertion to the enemy.

His officers kept teasing and urging him to make use of the eagerness of the army now, which would speedily bring glorious results. If the battle should turn out adversely, they could fall back to their walls and put the same fortifications between themselves and the enemy. Brutus was especially vexed with these, for they were his officers, and he grieved that they, who were exposed to the same peril as himself, should capriciously side with the soldiers in preferring a quick and doubtful chance to a victory without danger; but, to the ruin of himself and them, he yielded, chiding them with these words, "I seem to be carrying on war like Pompey the Great, not so much commanding as commanded." I think that Brutus restricted himself to these words in order to conceal his greatest fear, lest those of his soldiers who had formerly served under Cæsar should become disaffected and desert to the enemy. This both himself and Cassius had apprehended from the beginning, and they had been careful not to give any excuse for such disaffection toward themselves.

So Brutus led out his army unwillingly and formed them in line of battle before his walls, ordering them not to advance very far from the hill so that they might have a safe retreat if necessary and a good position for hurling darts at the enemy. In each army the men exchanged exhortations with each other. There was great eagerness for battle, and unbounded confidence. On the one side was the fear of famine, on the other a well-deserved shame that they had constrained their general to fight when he still favored delay, and fear lest they should come short of their promises and prove weaker than their boastings, and expose themselves to the charge of rashness instead of winning praise for good counsel; because also Brutus, riding through the ranks on horseback, showed himself before them with a severe countenance and reminded them in a few words of what the opportunity offered. "You want to fight," he said; "you force me to battle when I am able to conquer otherwise.u(mei=s me e(te/rws e)/xonta nika=n e)bia/sasqe. The Latin version of Candidus reads, "You have forced me, who thought differently, and had victory in my grasp, to come to battle." Mendelssohn thinks that there is a lacuna in the existing text after the word e(te/rws, which should be filled in accordance with the version of Candidus. Professor Wright suggests the rendering I have given above, which is clear and forceful without any change of the text. Do not falsify my hopes or your own. You have the advantage of the higher ground and everything safe in your rear. The enemy's position is the one of peril because he lies between you and famine." With these words he passed on, the soldiers telling him to trust them and echoing his words with shouts of confidence.

Octavius and Antony rode through their own ranks shaking hands with those nearest them, and urging them in the most serious manner to do their duty, and not concealing the danger of famine, because they believed that that would be the greatest incitement to bravery. "Soldiers," they said, "we have found the enemy. We have before us those whom we sought to catch outside of their fortifications. Let none of you shame his own challenge or prove unequal to his own threat. Let no one prefer hunger, that unmanageable and distressing evil, to the walls and bodies of the enemy which they will yield to bravery, to the sword, to despair. Our situation at this moment is so pressing that nothing can be postponed till to-morrow, but this very day must decide for us either a complete victory or an honorable death. If we conquer we gain in one day and by one blow provisions, money, ships, and camps, and the prizes of victory offered by ourselves. Such will be the result if, from our first onset upon them, we are mindful of the necessity urging us on, and if, after breaking their ranks, we immediately cut them off from their gates and drive them upon the rocks or into the plain, so that the war may not spring up again or these enemies get away for another period of idleness -- the only warriors who are so weak as to rest their hopes, not on fighting, but on declining to fight."

In this way Octavius and Antony roused the spirit of those with whom they came in contact. The emulation of the troops was excited to show themselves worthy of their commanders and also to escape the danger of famine, which had been greatly augmented by the naval disaster in the Adriatic. They preferred, if necessary, to suffer in battle, with the hope of success, rather than be wasted by an irresistible foe. Inspired by these thoughts, which each man exchanged with his nearest neighbor, the spirit of the two armies was wonderfully raised and both were filled with undaunted courage. They did not now remember that they were fellow-citizens of their enemies, but hurled threats at each other as though they had been enemies by birth and descent, so much did the anger of the moment extinguish reason and nature in them. Both sides divined equally that this day and this battle would decide the fate of Rome completely; and it did decide it.

The day was consumed in preparations till the ninth hour,The Roman day, from sunrise to sunset, was divided into twelve hours. The ninth hour was three o'clock in the afternoon. at which time two eagles fell upon each other and fought in the space between the armies, amid the profoundest silence. When the one on the side of Brutus took flight his enemies raised a great shout and battle was joined.Plutarch relates this and several other prodigies on the authority of Publius Volumnius, a philosopher, who was serving in the army under Brutus. One of these was of a very unusual kind. The arm of one of the centurions in Brutus' camp sweated oil of roses; and although it was several times wiped and dried, it did not cease. ( 48.) What this portended we are not informed. The onset was superb and terrible. They had little need of arrows, stones, or javelins, which are customary in war, for they did not resort to the usual manœuvres and tactics of battles, but, coming to close combat with naked swords, they slew and were slain, seeking to break each other's ranks. On the one side it was a fight for self-preservation rather than victory; on the other for victory and for the satisfaction of the general who had been forced to fight against his will. The slaughter and the groans were terrible. The bodies of the fallen were carried back and others stepped into their places from the rear ranks. The generals flew hither and thither overlooking everything, exciting the men by their ardor, exhorting the toilers to toil on, and relieving those who were exhausted so that there was always fresh courage at the front. Finally, the soldiers of Octavius, either from fear of famine, or by the good fortune of Octavius himself (for the soldiers of Brutus were not blameworthy), pushed back the enemy's line as though they were putting in motion a very heavy machine. The latter were driven back step by step, slowly at first and without loss of courage. Presently their ranks began to dissolve and they retreated more rapidly, and then the second and third ranks in the rear retreated with them, all mingled together in disorder, crowded by each other and by the enemy, who pressed upon them without ceasing until it became plainly a flight. The soldiers of Octavius, then especially mindful of the order they had received, seized the gates of the enemy's fortification, but at great risk to themselves because they were exposed to missiles from above and in front, but they prevented a great many of the enemy from gaining entrance. These fled, some to the sea, and some through the river Zygactes to the mountains.

The enemy having been routed, the generals divided the remainder of the work between themselves, Octavius to capture those who should break out of the camp and to watch the main camp, while Antony was everywhere, and everywhere attacking, falling upon the fugitives and those who still held together, and upon their other camping-places, crushing all with vehement impetuosity. Fearing lest the leaders should escape him and collect another army, he despatched cavalry upon the roads and outlets of the field of battle to capture those who were trying to escape. These divided their work; some of them hurried up the mountain with Rhascus, the Thracian, who was sent with them on account of his knowledge of the roads. They surrounded the fortified positions and escarpments, hunted down the fugitives, and kept watch upon those inside. Others pursued Brutus himself. Lucilius seeing them rushing on furiously, surrendered himself, pretending to be Brutus, and asked them to take him to Antony instead of Octavius; for which reason chiefly he was believed to be Brutus trying to avoid his implacable enemy. When Antony heard that they were bringing him, he went to meet him, with a pause to reflect on the fortune, the dignity, and the virtue of the man, and thinking how he should receive Brutus. As he was approaching, Lucilius presented himself, and said with perfect boldness, "You have not captured Brutus, nor will virtue ever be taken prisoner by vice. I deceived these men and so here I am." Antony, observing that the horse-men were ashamed of their mistake, consoled them, saying, "The game you have caught for me is not worse, but better than you think -- as much better as a friend is than an enemy." Then he committed Lucilius to the care of one of his friends, and later took him into his own service and employed him in a confidential capacity.